Unity in diversity? Muslim civil society and Muslims in civil society in Gujarat, India by Susewind, Raphael  et al.

iv
BANDUNG SPIRIT BOOK SERIES
RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN A GLOBALISED SOCIETY:  
Challenges and Responses in Africa and Asia 
With a Comparative View from Europe 
55 Years after the Bandung Asian-African Conference 1955
 
Editor: Darwis Khudori
All right reserved.  
Copy Right © 2013 by Darwis Khudori  
ISBN: 978-979-18746-0-1
Language Editor: Jacky Hall  
Cover and Layout: Erwinthon P. Napitupulu  
Logo of Bandung Spirit: Erwinthon P. Napitupulu 
The logo of Bandung Spirit was designed for the commemoration of the 50th anniversary 
of Bandung Asian-African Conference 1955 organised by civil society movements in 
Indonesia on April 2005. It takes a form of a flower as a symbol of love and peace. The 
number of petals (50) refers to the 50th anniversary, while the five colours symbolise 
five continents and their cultural diversity. The composition of the petals is such that 
it gives impression of a collective movement following the movement of the hands of 
clock, symbolising dynamism, interdependence and solidarity following the time.  
Publisher
CSSCS (Centre for South-South Cooperation Studies)




Ateneo de Davao University, Davao, Mindanao, the Philippines
http://alqalam.addu.edu.ph/
GRIC
Group of Research on Identity and Culture, University of Le Havre, France
http://www.univ-lehavre.fr/recherche/gric/index.phph 
ILDES
Lebanese Institute for Economic and Social Development, Beirut, Lebanon
http://www.ildeslebanon.org 
SWIR
Centre for World Christianity and Interreligious Studies, Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands
http://www.ru.nl/swir
1CONTENT
PREFACE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
INTRODUCTION 
Diagnosis, Proposals and Actions related to Religious Diversity in Africa 
and Asia
Darwis Khudori  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .5
DIAGNOSIS
Monotheism Over Other Religions
The Spiritual Evil of Africa – Christianity and Islam: Reflection 
around the Spiritual Liberation of the Africans
Tiburce Koffi  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .23
Indigenous Belief and Trans-Faith in Indonesia: The Case of the 
Maybrat, Imian and Sawiat Tribes in West Papua
Hamah Sagrim  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .29
Visualising African Traditional Religion from a Non-African 
Perspective
Pushpraj Singh  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .35
Religious Pluralism and the Problems of Secularism: The Nigerian 
Experience
Chijioke Ndubuisi  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .46
Communitarism Over Individual
Religious Diversity and Juridical Pluralism in Lebanon
Nasreddine El Hage  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .57
Pancasila vs. the Ormas: Challenges to Indonesian National 
Development
Laura Steckman  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .75
Islam and Religious Diversity in Indonesia: The Case of 
Muhammadiyah 
Darwis Khudori  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .85
Majority Over Minority
Religion – for World Peace or Conflict
Sudha Chauhan  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .98
Confessional Diversity in the Arab World: Tensions in the Christian – 
Muslim Relations
Boutros Labaki .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 111
Violence in the Name of Buddhism: How the Marriage of Burma’s 
Popular Islamophobia and the neo-Fascist State Led to Rohingya 
Genocide
Maung Zarni  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .124
2 Content
Men Over Women
The Veil: A Symbol of 3,000 Years of Religious Male Domination
Mohamed Kacimi  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .137
Hijab: Ethno-Markers and Political Negotiation
Duanghathai Buranajaroenkij  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .141
PROPOSALS
From Liberation to Reconstruction
Diversity and Homogeneity in African Religious Discourses
Julius Gathogo  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .151
Establishment, Protection and Reinforcement of Secularism
Religion as a Shield Against Religious Extremism. The Case of Mali
Moussa Mara  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .166
Inter-faith Dialogues
 Religion and Civil Crisis: An Imperative for Inter-Faith Dialogue in 
Nigeria
Matthew O .C . Kalu  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .174
ACTIONS
Campaign
Managing Religious Toleration and Sustainable Development in the 
Context of Kenya’s War on Terror: The Role of Religious Authorities
Oscar Gakuo Mwangi  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .185
Dialogue
Religious Diversity: A Chance or a Threat for Peace and 
Development in the Bangsamoro New Political Entity?
Mussolini Sinsuat Lidasan  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .195
Research
“This is Why We Make Noise”: National Unity and Religious Diversity 
in Indonesia and Tanzania
Frans Wijsen, Suhadi Cholil, Thomas Ndaluka  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .210
Unity in Diversity? Muslim Civil Society and Muslims in Civil Society 
in Gujarat, India
Raphael Susewind  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .221
A Comparative View from Europe
 Asia-Europe People’s Forum Workshop Report on Religious 
Diversity, Secularism, Citizenship and Democracy
Centre Lebret-Irfed, Pax Romana, Bandung Spirit, AREDS India  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .229
CLOSING REMARK 
State and Secularisation: Resolving Problems of Religious Diversity
M . Faishal Aminuddin  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .248
BIODATA  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .251
BANDUNG SPIRIT BOOK SERIES  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .257
221
R A P H A e l  S U S e W I N D
Unity in Diversity? Muslim Civil Society 
and Muslims in Civil Society in Gujarat, India
ABSTRACT
In spring 2002, the Indian State of Gujarat witnessed the worst communal riots 
in the country since decades. With more than tacit State support, more than 2000 
people – most of them Muslims – were murdered and ten thousands permanently 
internally displaced. While sizeable stretches of Gujarati civil society reacted 
with reluctance or even ignorance to the riots of 2002, a number of organisations, 
networks and professionals joined hands and form an undoubtedly small yet 
impressively striving ‘peace community’. 
Given the communalist roots of the riots, the proposed chapter asks: does 
this ‘peace community’ consider religious diversity as a condition, a motor, an 
obstacle or a goal of sustainable development? And, to begin with, how does it 
reflect religious diversity in its own ranks? 
The chapter is part of a larger project and builds on field research in the 
Gujarati ‘peace community’ in spring 2008. It demonstrates how NGOs were taken 
off guard by the extent of communal violence in 2002, which initially united them 
in their efforts at relief and rehabilitation. Once a first hue of normalcy returned, 
however, this unity in diversity faltered and gave way to considerable tensions. 
Two differences in particular emerged: between those organisations preferring to 
work in conflict as opposed to work on conflict – and between faith-based trusts 
and many of their secular counterparts. Both categories of organisations were, 
however, internally diverse: actors who draw strength from religion cannot only be 
found in faith-based organisations nor does everyone in secular NGOs subscribe 
to this particular creed.
The chapter therefore dissects the internal diversity of Muslim civil society 
and Muslims in civil society to emphasise that it is not only important how civil 
society sees religious diversity, but also how it represents and respects such 
diversity internally. By looking both at the ‘reality’ of social life among faith-based 
and secular initiatives and at the discourses surrounding this life, the chapter 
would bridge the two angles of analysis envisaged for the edited volume.
KEYWORDS: India, Gujarat, Communal Riots, Hindus, Muslims, Civil Society, Peace 
Activism, NGOs, FBOs
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In spring 2002, the Indian State Gujarat witnessed the worst communal riots 
in the country for decades . With more than just tacit State support, over 
2000 people – most of them Muslims – were murdered and ten thousand 
permanently internally displaced (see Varadarajan 2002; Engineer 2003; Shani 
2007; Wilkinson 2007) . Sizeable stretches of Gujarati civil society reacted 
with reluctance or even ignorance to the riots, including – in the Mahatma’s 
homeland – quite a few Gandhian organisations . Others however joined hands 
and form an undoubtedly small yet impressively striving ‘peace community’ . 
Given the communalist roots of the riots, this chapter asks whether this ‘peace 
community’ regards religious diversity as a condition, a motor, an obstacle or a 
goal of its activities? And, to begin with, how does it reflect religious diversity 
in its own ranks?
The critical answers to these questions stem from field research for a wider 
project, undertaken in spring 2008 (Susewind 2013) . The data demonstrate that 
many activists were taken off guard by the extent of communal violence, a shock 
that initially united them in their efforts at relief and rehabilitation. Once a first hue 
of normalcy returned to the refugee camps, however, this unity in diversity faltered 
and gave way to considerable tensions . Two differences in particular emerged: 
between those organisations working in rather than explicitly on conflict – and 
between Islamic charitable trusts and many of their secularist counterparts . These 
tensions were tangible in everyday interactions rather than general approach .
At the outset, peace-building was new to practically everyone in Gujarat; 
most “NGOs were ‘taken off guard by the extent of communal violence in 2002’ 
and very quickly realised the need for a long-term strategy” (Powers 2009:157; 
Ganguly et al . 2006; Lobo & Das 2006; Jasani 2008; Oommen 2008; Robinson 
2005; Gupta 2011) . Nearly all organisations who began to work for peace 
initially joined makeshift action platforms to coordinate their relief efforts: in the 
immediate aftermath of the riots, cultural and ideological differences gave way to 
the pressing needs of shelter, food and safety . After a couple of months, however, 
this unity in diversity began to falter . While some faith-based organisations 
remained focused on material rehabilitation, others began to oscillate between 
‘spiritual reconstruction’ and missionary work, and yet others as well as most 
secular organisations did venture further into more political interventions . Today, 
some groups provide victims with relief, others organise legal counsel and press 
for accountability, while others still promote dialogue, treat psychological trauma 
or raise awareness of communalism in the public sphere .
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The emerging diversity of approaches and goals quickly complicated 
what counts as legitimate peace activism, a quarrel reflected in the multitude of 
Hindi/Urdu/Gujarati terms for ‘peace’ used by the various actors . The following 
are just some of the most frequent ones (McGregor 1993; Sen 2010:20-22 and 
Robinson 2005:215):
  shanti, meaning 1) calmness, quiet; stillness; peace (of mood) . 2) rest, 
repose . 3) peace (between factions, powers) – bearing a sanskritic 
connotation of cosmic balance and harmony . 
  sukun, meaning quiet, rest, peace – in a rather more personal sense than 
cosmic shanti; the word originally stems from Arabic . 
  aman, meaning 1) security, safety . 2) assurance of safety; quarter, mercy 
– an understanding of peace restricted to absence of violence; the word 
again stems from Arabic . 
  nyay, meaning 1) right or fitting manner, or method; 2) justice. 3) law; 
entitlement, right . 4) just or proper act, or judgement . 5) adjudication, 
decision (in a case). 6) the Nyaya system; logic. 7) demonstration, fitting 
illustration (of a case) – justice understood in an encompassing sense not 
limited to lawfulness . 
Which of these terms would most adequately capture ‘peace activism’ is 
contested among local practitioners, and quite a few of them also changed and 
adjusted their own approach several times during the years of experimenting 
and learning post-2002 . In particular, many activists grew increasingly sceptical 
of interventions that focus on peace as shanti (cosmic balance) at the expense 
of peace as nyay (lived, real justice; see Gupta 2011) . Beyond its implication 
of stabilising an unjust status quo, shanti seems particularly problematic since 
the term is most frequently found among expressly Hindu organisations, which 
easily smacks of ill-suited denial of the depth of religio-political abyss on their 
part. Yet on the other hand, it is equally clear that “while justice must always 
be worth striving for, for ordinary people the resumption of life in the everyday 
demands compromise and negotiations of a far more complex and nuanced 
kind” (Robinson 2005:217) .
Such negotiations transcend terminological debates; intentions, 
motivations and aspirations of those classifying one way or the other can thus 
better be traced in their comprehensive ‘mission’ and ‘vision’ statements . The 
long established, Muslim-run yet avowedly secularist NGO Sanchetana, for 
instance, describe their strategy as follows:
[We] identify the common problems of the common poor people, work with them 
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to create awareness about the commonality of their problems. This could lead to a 
possibility of forming organisations of people from various religions to address the 
issues afflicting them. The bondage thus created can be strengthened by jointly 
planning action programs. This breaks the alienation and sense of separateness. 
[...] Their identity of being religious persons can be broadened to various identities 
(NGO brochure).
It is Sanchetana’s strong belief that, in the words of a participant in one of their 
workshops, Muslims “have sharpened our identity of being Muslims a little too 
much”, have paid too much attention to faith and attached too much emotional 
importance to their in-group . Accordingly, Sanchetana organised ‘leadership 
development camps’ to help young Muslims to strike free from the grasp of the 
ulema (religious scholars) . The motivation was to form ‘secular’ citizens, who 
disavow religion in the public sphere . Like many in Gujarat, Sanchetana argued 
that religion has been instrumentalised by politicians in 2002 . Consequently, 
it would be more promising to weave a strong social fabric which can resist 
such instrumentalisation than to start interfaith dialogues, which only reinforce 
a ‘misleading’ emphasis on religion . Thus Sanchetana based its interventions 
in what peace researchers call a ‘contact hypothesis’: the NGO tried to engage 
people from different communities in cross-cutting issues other than peace-
building, communal relations or faith, working mostly in conflict, not explicitly 
on conflict (Varshney 2002).
Other civil society organisations however decided to venture into explicit 
peace-building, i .e . began to work on conflict. They argued that even if it is wrong 
to assume that “religion is the main culprit and the whole fight is religious”, “this 
is the general perception – and in this context it is perception which matters, not 
reality[ .] We must deal with the religious aspect as well as all the others, so as to 
create a spirit of co-operation between the two major religious communities of 
India, Hindus and Muslims” (Engineer 1995:284) . An example is the approach 
of the NGO Samerth:
In the year 2005, Samerth initiated the process of networking with schools to conduct 
sessions with the children on peace-building using the peace education modules. 
[...] One of the staff comments: “if children ingrain these values, change in their 
attitudes will definitely ensure peace and harmony” (NGO brochure)..
Here, communal conflict itself is the focus of intervention. One tension between 
Sanchetana and Samerth thus concerns working in and on conflict: which 
approach is best to follow, contact hypothesis or peace education? Both NGOs 
share, however, an explicitly secular framework, as the former, too, “envisions 
promoting secular and rationalist education” (as they write in the same pamphlet) .
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The other and, arguably for this book, the more important fault line in the 
Gujarati ‘peace community’ lies therefore between ‘secular’ and ‘faith-based’ 
organisations. Indeed, many beneficiaries retain doubts about the interventions 
of traditional NGOs which on purpose do not touch (or even acknowledge) some 
of the deeper dynamics of religion and conflict (Oommen 2008:194). While 
NGOs thus ignore victims’ self-expressed needs for ‘spiritual reconstruction’, 
FBOs, in catering to this need, both fill an important void left by NGOs – and 
further their particular religious agenda .
A prominent example of such a faith-based organisation is the Gujarat 
Sarvajanik Welfare Trust (GSWT), part of the Tablighi Jamaat movement which 
“was one of the most important groups which had the resources to organise relief 
and rehabilitation work after the post-Godhra violence of 2002” (Chakrabarti 
2010:619) . Its board of trustees is populated by muftis, shaikhs and ulema, and 
their mission is clearly communicated in religious language:
The communal riots of 2002 in the State of Gujarat was a challenge to the 
trust of saving human lives and their rehabilitation . The trust accepted the challenge, 
struggled hard and with the mercy of Allah, achieve the goal (GSWT flyer).
The trust – and most similar FBOs – already began to open up to 
‘mainstream’ civil society after the earthquake that hit Gujarat in 2001 . Post 
2002, they gradually slipped into relief and peace-building work. As “it is 
difficult for any Muslim organisation, no matter how peaceful its goals, to obtain 
funding from abroad” (Powers 2009:142, in reference to GSWT), Muslim 
charitable trusts often had to rely on traditional forms of philanthropy to sponsor 
their projects . In addition, their leaders often took funding from their own 
pockets and began to work out of personal consternation and genuine shock, 
without any explicit strategy – missionary or otherwise (Chakrabarti 2010) . It is 
therefore both astonishing and important to acknowledge that “the bulk of the 
funds and human resources for food, housing and water came largely, though 
not exclusively, from FBOs” (Gupta 2011:49) .
As a reaction to such traditional charitable endeavours and in search of 
access to hitherto ignored Muslim communities, some of the non-faith-based 
organisations – including Sanchetana – began to deepen their earthquake-
induced collaboration with GSWT and similar trusts . The rationale behind 
these efforts was clear: “being an organisation that made deep inroads and 
gained considerable goodwill, particularly among the Muslims of Ahmedabad” 
(Oommen 2008:156), the trust provided a reliable grass-roots partner in a 
community so far neglected by ‘mainstream’ civil society . 
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However, the trust’s strong roots among Muslims “is a source of strength as 
well as weakness in some respects . Working in an extremely polarised situation, 
its intention can easily be taken as suspect” (Oommen 2008:156) . The particular 
strength of Muslim charities thus had to be balanced against suspicions about 
the potentially negative impact of their orthodoxy on these very communities . 
Moreover, Sanchetana and other NGOs were deeply committed to the ‘contact 
hypothesis’ of peace-building, as we already saw. Thus “a major criterion was 
that anything an organisation proposed had to be inter-communal in the target 
population” (Powers 2009:132) . Most Muslim groups fell short by this standard . 
Even though they frequently shared the ‘contact hypothesis’ in principle and 
wished to overcome communal boundaries in cross-cutting initiatives, they 
and their beneficiaries were also afraid to engage with Hindus after the riots. 
Demanding inter-communal contact in this context is arguably easier for NGOs 
rooted in majority society than for Muslim activists who were often victimised 
themselves . Hindu and secular initiatives did not always acknowledge this 
contextual distribution of power and trust – and neither does the academic 
literature on the horizontal integration of civil society pay enough attention to 
vertical hierarchies (Basu & Roy 2007:19) .
Furthermore, “the growing influence of [missionary] organisations had 
little co-relation with their resettlement plans and policies” (Jasani 2008:431) . 
Of course, FBOs by definition pursue more than a mere material agenda of 
reconstruction, and this wider agenda impacts on the subjectivities of Muslims . 
Still, it is important to perceive and represent Muslims not as mere passive 
recipients of such missionary activities, but as active participants, who have a 
say in their identity . Many Muslims are well able to resist, subvert or selectively 
appropriate discourse – be it the discourse of FBOs or the ‘missions’ and 
‘visions’ put forward by mainstream civil society . It would be dangerous and 
illiberal to put religiously motivated agency per se under suspicion and “the fact 
that the GSWT constantly feared being labelled anti-national in itself could [and 
should] be a learning experience for civil society groups working in conflict 
situations” (Oommen 2008:151; Gupta 2011) .
Rather than learning from this experience, however, the ‘peace community’ 
in Gujarat remains structurally blind toward its Muslim members . Many 
secular NGOs consider their faith-based counterparts highly communalised, 
but at the same time do not recognise non-observant Muslims who work for 
peace as Muslims . The leadership from within Muslim communities is rejected 
as illegitimate because it is faith-based, and, if it is not faith-based, it is not 
recognised as legitimately Muslim: lack of leadership may then be the inevitable 
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consequence of these presumptions rather than an empirical fact . Or, to put it 
bluntly: that mainstream civil society leadership has not reached out to Muslim 
communities in the past does not mean that only the advent of NGO interventions 
among Muslims can bring about Muslim leadership . 
This realisation has far-reaching consequences . Simpson (2006) argued 
that “by isolating Muslims from economic resources and political representation, 
the organisations of Hindu nationalism enliven their own foundational myths, 
which state that the Hindu majority is in need of protection from the troublesome, 
isolationist and secretive Muslim minority” (p . 331) . Well-meaning civil society 
activists might unintentionally tap into the same fallacy by imagining a ‘Muslim 
community’, distinct from their own circles, ‘isolationist and secretive’, ‘out there’ 
and in dire need of leadership . Surely, those articulating such views want to reach 
out and support this imagined community of victims, which sharply contrasts 
hindutva projects . But they still miss the fact that Muslim activists are not just ‘out 
there’, but actually exist amidst themselves, and by no way passively so .
In this context, it is also important to note that neither institutional 
affiliation nor a preferred peace-building approach necessarily imply a certain 
way of ‘being Muslim and working for peace’ . To the contrary: ‘faith-based 
actors’ can very well be found beyond the realm of Islamic charities; ‘secular 
technocrats’ sometimes work for explicitly Muslim organisations; and ‘doubting 
professionals’ and ‘emancipating women’ spread across the whole range of 
organisations and approaches (Susewind 2013) . 
A whole layer of complexity could arguably be brought in here, but for 
the purpose of this chapter, the contestation over definitions of ‘peace activism’, 
the conflicts over strategy and the difficulties of cooperation between NGOs 
and FBOs alone should demonstrate that Muslim civil society and Muslims in 
civil society constitute a rather complex array of actors . While many of these 
actors, both faith-based and not, consider religious diversity a strategic goal, 
they fare badly when judged on that criterion in respect of their own everyday 
activities . It is thus important to emphasise not only how civil society perceives 
religious diversity, but also how it represents such diversity in its categorisations, 
strategies and co-operations . This not least cautions against an uncritical belief in 
contemporary ‘diversity talk’ around the globe, which is likewise not always put 
into practice .***
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